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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Pirate Bay1 is the world’s largest bit-torrent tracker.2  The website 
essentially hosts content uploaded by users to be downloaded by other users.  
Because much of the exchanged content is protected by national and 
international copyright law, The Pirate Bay is considered to be in violation of 
those intellectual property protections.3  This activity has led to the arrest, 
prosecution, and imprisonment of one of the website’s founders.4  Though 
this action against the founders was successful, the website itself still exists 
and boasts that “[zero] torrents [have] been removed, and [zero] torrents will 
ever be removed.”5  Various supporters of The Pirate Bay have come up with 
many methods and means to get around attempts at shutting down their 
website, most notably installing servers on unmanned drones6 and moving 
their servers to a cloud network.7  But recent international legal 
developments may make these extraordinary measures unnecessary: the 
Pirate Bay would not only be able to continue its activities, but would be able 
do so legally. 
In January of 2013, the twin-island nation of Antigua and Barbuda 
(Antigua) announced that the World Trade Organization (WTO) had 
authorized it to suspend certain obligations to the United States in regards 
to intellectual property.8  This declaration came as a result of a decade-long 
                                                                                                                   
 1 The Pirate Bay Bundle, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se (last visited Nov. 20, 
2013). 
 2 About, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/about (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 3 Nick Bilton, The Pirate Bay Offers Web Browser to Avoid Censorship, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/10/the-pirate-bay-offers-piratebro 
wser-to-avoid-censorship/?_r=0. 
 4 Eric Pfanner, Four Convicted in Sweden in Internet Piracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 
2009, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/18/business/global/18pirate.html. 
 5 Legal Threats Against The Pirate Bay, THE PIRATE BAY, http://thepiratebay.se/legal (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 6 “MrSpock,” TPB Loss, PIRATE BAY BLOG (Mar. 18, 2012), https://thepiratebay.se/blog/ 
210; Nick Bilton, Internet Pirates Will Always Win, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2012, at SR5, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/05/sunday-review/internet-pirates-will-always-
win.html. 
 7 Winston Brahma, The Pirate Cloud, THE PIRATE BAY (Oct. 17, 2012), http://thepir 
atebay.se/blog/224; The Pirate Bay Moves to the Cloud to Avoid Shutdown, BBC (Oct. 17, 
2012, 12:01 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-19982440. 
 8 Press Release, PRNewswire, Antigua to Pursue Sanctions Against the United States in 
Decade-Long Trade (Jan. 28, 2013) [hereinafter Levick Release], available at http://www.anti 
guawto.com/wto/Levick_Release.pdf.  
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dispute between the two countries over the accessibility of Antigua-based 
online gambling websites within the United States.9  The dispute settlement 
system’s appellate body ruled that the U.S. practice of blocking access to 
these websites violated its obligations under the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).10 According to the United States Trade 
Representative, Antigua’s suspension of U.S. copyright would be 
unprecedented and amount to government-sponsored piracy.11  And to 
whom would Antigua grant a letter of marque and reprisal?  It seems they 
will look to none other than The Pirate Bay.12   
But what do you call a government-sponsored pirate?  History 
occasionally grants such actors the label of “privateers.”  The determination 
of titles often depends on who is telling the story.  During the American War 
for Independence, the Colonies enlisted the aid of “merchant mariners” to 
harass British shipping and support the Colonies’ cause.13  The United States 
looks back fondly upon these “privateers.”14  The British, however, certainly 
have a different recollection of the seamen that pirated their vessels.15  How 
will the actions of Antigua and Barbuda be remembered?  Like the pirates 
and privateers of centuries past, this determination will depend on 
perspective.  However, unlike in the past, today’s perspectives can develop 
based on overlapping international legal regimes, not conflicting national 
security or military interests.  For example, a sanction that is legal under the 
WTO may be illegal under other international regimes, particularly under 
                                                                                                                   
 9 Id. 
 10 General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1167 [hereinafter 
GATS]; Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994); Paul Rothstein, Note, Moving All-In with the World Trade Organization: 
Ignoring Adverse Rulings and Gambling with the Future of the WTO, 37 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 151, 152 (2008). 
 11 Annie Lowrey, Caribbean Nation Gets an International Go-Ahead to Break U.S. 
Copyright Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2013, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/20 
13/01/29/business/global/dispute-with-antigua-and-barbuda-threatens-us-copyrights.html. 
 12 David Kravets, WTO Allows Antigua to Open Piracy Site, WIRED (Jan. 29, 2013, 12:06 
PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/01/antigua-piracy-site/; Ernesto, Pirate Bay and 
Antigua Explore Launch of Authorized “Pirate Site,” TORRENTFREAK (May 3, 2013), 
http://torrentfreak.com/pirate-bay-and-antigua-explore-launch-of-authorized-pirate-sit e-
130503/. 
 13 John Frayler, Stories From The Revolution: Privateers in the American Revolution, 
NAT’L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/revwar/about_the_revolution/privateers.html (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 14 See, e.g., John Paul Jones, DISCOVERY YORKSHIRE COAST, http://www.discoveryorkshir 
ecoast.com/history-and-info/region/john-paul-jones.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 15 Id. 
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some of the treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO).16 
This Note examines what happens when those kinds of “cross-retaliation” 
measures are imposed and result in conflicting status under international law.  
First, this Note will examine in detail the development of the WTO 
framework, specifically in regards to the WTO “grand bargain” and the rise 
and development of cross retaliation.  Second, this Note will discuss WIPO’s 
main two treaties, as well as their relation to and interaction with the WTO 
and its treaties.  Third, this Note will contemplate the tensions between 
TRIPS and the WIPO treaties, as well as other possible conflicts of a similar 
nature with other regimes, such as the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement.  Fourth, this Note will look 
to other international agreements that can serve as models to stem the tide of 
future conflicts.  Finally, this Note will explore the ramifications for 
international law arising from these conflicts and outline a path forward for 
developing international regimes in a more unified, streamlined fashion that 
reduces, if not prevents, future conflicts of this nature. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  WTO 
1.  Overview and the “Grand Bargain” 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an institution that “provides a 
forum for negotiating agreements aimed at reducing obstacles to 
international trade and ensuring a level playing field for all, thus contributing 
to economic growth and development.”17  The WTO was formed from an 
                                                                                                                   
 16 The World Intellectual Property Organization “is the global forum for intellectual 
property services, policy, information and cooperation.”  It is “a self-funding agency of the 
United Nations, with 188 member states.”  Additionally, it’s mission “is to lead the 
development of a balanced and effective international intellectual property system . . . that 
enables innovation and creativity for the benefit of all.”  The organization’s “mandate, 
governing bodies and procedures are set out in the WIPO convention, which established 
WIPO in 1967.”  Inside WIPO, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en (last visited May 
19, 2014). 
 17 See About the WTO-A statement by former Director-General Pascal Lamy, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/wto_dg_stat_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 
2013) [hereinafter WTO Mission Statement]. 
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amalgamation of agreements18 as a place for countries to go to sort out their 
various trade issues with each other.19  This collection of agreements 
represented a “grand bargain” struck between all of the countries involved 
during the Uruguay Rounds.20  One of these agreements, the Agreement on 
Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),21 brought 
intellectual property (IP) rights into the purview of the WTO.22  TRIPS 
instituted a global IP regime with specific requirements to safeguard and 
implement copyrights and other provisions of IP law.23  The treaty also 
“provides for minimum standards that bind all WTO members, coupled with 
a system of international enforcement.”24  Another part of the grand bargain 
of the Uruguay Round was the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS).  The GATS is modeled on the earlier General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT),25 the basis for the WTO,26 “in both name and content.”27  
The GATS, as the GATT does for trade in goods, outlines general principles 
and obligations governing the trade of services.28  These principles are the 
most-favored-nation (MFN) standard, national treatment (NT), and 
                                                                                                                   
 18 Who We Are, WTO [hereinafter WTO Who We Are], http://www.wto.org/english/the 
wto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 19 See Understanding the WTO, WTO, http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_ 
e/tif_e/htm [hereinafter Understanding the WTO], available at http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/tif_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 20 See William A. Lovett, Bargaining Challenges and Conflicting Interests: Implementing 
the Doha Round, 17 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 951, 951–55 (2002) (providing a summary of the 
“grand bargain” in international trade that occurred in the early to mid-1990s and the 
economic results in the years that followed); see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the 
World Trade Organization art. II(2), Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter Marrakesh 
Agreement] (binding WTO member states to all annexed legal agreements, including TRIPS). 
 21 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994; 
Marrakesh Agreement, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 
I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. 
 22 Anu Bradford, When the WTO Works, and How It Fails, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 15–16 
(2010). 
 23 Id. at 16 (citing TRIPS, arts. 9–14 (recognizing copyrights); id. at 15–21 (recognizing 
trademarks); id. at 27–34 (recognizing patents)). 
 24 Id. (citing TRIPS, supra note 21, arts. 1(1), 3, 8 (describing the scope of obligations and 
the basic principle of national treatment), arts. 63–64, 68–73 (describing the dispute settlement 
mechanism)). 
 25 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. 
A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].  
 26 Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty, 16 WIS. INT’L L.J. 421, 442–43 
(1998). 
 27 Kevin C. Kennedy, A WTO Agreement on Investment: A Solution in Search of a 
Problem?, 24 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 77, 104 (2003). 
 28 Id. 
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transparency.29  Under GATS, MFN requires “that once the host accepts a 
[specific type of] project from one home country, it will be required to 
extend the same treatment to similar projects from any other member 
country.”30  NT under the GATS differs slightly from the GATT in that it is a 
“specific commitment” made in trade negotiations.31  At that point, “the 
member guarantees it will impose no limits on market access or national 
treatment in relation to services and service suppliers falling within the scope 
of those sectors.”32  The transparency principle of GATS requires “that each 
member clearly and fully reveal any laws or regulations that would affect 
another entering member’s producers in services.”33  The MFN, the NT, and 
transparency, along with various market access commitments,34 supported by 
the GATS eight annexes of guidelines and deadlines, make up the main 
obligations created by the GATS.35  The first two principles, MFN and NT, 
and the market access commitments are the most important components of 
the GATS in regards to this Note because Antigua alleged that the United 
States violated these components (as well as multiple other articles that do 
not fall within the scope of this Note) in the U.S.-Gambling dispute.36  
Though the Dispute Settlement Body ultimately only proceeded with the 
market access commitment claim, which will be discussed more in depth 
                                                                                                                   
 29 Id. 
 30 Glenn M. Wiser, The Clean Development Mechanism Versus The World Trade 
Organization: Can Free-Market Greenhouse Gas Emissions Abatement Survive Free Trade?, 
11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 531, 594 (1999). 
 31 Nancy J. King & Kishani Kalupahana, Choosing Between Liberalization and Regulatory 
Autonomy under GATS: Implications of U.S.–Gambling for Trade in Cross Border E-Services, 
40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1189, 1203 (2007). 
 32 Id. at 1206. 
 33 Christopher F. Thornberg & Frances L. Edwards, Failure of Trade Liberalization: A 
Study of the GATS Negotiation, 10 J. INT’L BUS. & L. 325, 326–27 (2011) (citing GATS, supra 
note 10, art. III(1)–(2)). 
 34 GATS, supra note 10, art. XVI (explaining that members of the GATS “shall accord 
services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable [sic] than that 
provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its 
Schedule”). 
 35 Kennedy, supra note 27, at 104–05. 
 36 United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm (last visited 
Apr. 5, 2014).  
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later in the Note, it is still important to understand how these elements 
interact and overlap with other international obligations under WIPO.37  
2.  The Dispute Settlement Body and Cross Retaliation 
The Dispute Settlement Body, an organ of the WTO established under the 
Uruguay Round, resolves all disputes between WTO members regarding 
their obligations under the treaty and alleged violations.38  The Dispute 
Settlement Body has the power to grant various remedies to injured member 
states when another member state breaches its obligations.39  The available 
remedies include authorizing member states to suspend various concessions 
established under the WTO.40  Ordinarily, the suspension of concessions 
should correspond with the area of trade where the original breach occurs.41  
However, simply suspending concessions (such as reduced tariffs or MFN 
status) is not always sufficient to compel the member state in breach to come 
back into WTO compliance.42  This is characteristic of disputes between 
countries with uneven trade relationships.43  When a developed member-state 
is in breach and the injured member-state is developing, the typical 
remedy—raising tariffs against the violating country by an amount equal to 
the injured country’s loss—is not effective.44  In such cases, the Dispute 
Settlement Body has the power to authorize an extraordinary remedy known 
                                                                                                                   
 37 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 1.2, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter 
Decision by Arbitrator-Gambling]. 
 38 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes arts. 1–3, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.  
 41 Allison L. Whiteman, Comment, Cross Retaliation Under the TRIPS Agreement: An 
Analysis of Policy Options for Brazil, 36 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 187, 188 (2010). 
 42 Id. at 189–90 (explaining the significance of cross-retaliation as a means for leveraging 
non-compliant member states back into compliance with WTO obligations). 
 43 Id. at 194.  
 44 Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under 
TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World 
Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1374 (2009); see generally Decision by the 
Arbitrators, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of 
Bananas—Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities Under Article 22.6 of the 
DSU, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU (Mar. 24, 2000) [hereinafter EC-Bananas]. 
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as cross-retaliation.45  Cross-retaliation allows the aggrieved member-state to 
suspend its own WTO concessions to the breaching member-state in an area 
of trade different from the area in which the breach occurred.46  This allows 
the smaller, injured member-state to have substantially more leverage against 
the larger, breaching member-state than would otherwise be available.47 
The Dispute Settlement Body has authorized cross-retaliation only three 
times since its creation.48  While the Dispute Settlement Body has no explicit 
principle of stare decisis and thus these rulings are not technically binding, 
there is much evidence that a de facto system of precedent is in place.49 
Regardless of which view is more accurate, examining and analyzing these 
decisions is vital to understanding the intricacies of how the cross-retaliation 
system operates. 
3.  EC-Bananas  
The first example are the notorious EC-Bananas50 cases that arose as a 
result of the European Community’s unfair trade practices regarding its 
imports of bananas from developing African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries.51  The United Kingdom, a member of the European Community 
(EC),52 lobbied for preferential treatment for imports from these developing 
                                                                                                                   
 45 DSU, supra note 38, art. 22.3; see also Thomas Sebastian, World Trade Organization 
Remedies and the Assessment of Proportionality: Equivalence and Appropriateness, 48 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 337, 341–42 (2007) (explaining that, if necessary, cross retaliation under the WTO 
can occur between trade in goods, trade in services, and protection of intellectual property 
rights). 
 46 Whiteman, supra note 41, at 188–89 (explaining the option of cross-retaliating in areas of 
service under the GATS or intellectual property under TRIPS in response to a breach of WTO 
obligations in the trade of textiles under the GATT). 
 47 Id. at 189 (discussing the importance of cross-retaliation for Ecuador in leveraging the 
European Community into compliance). 
 48 Sebastian, supra note 45, at 341; see also David J. Townsend, Stretching the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding: U.S.—Cotton’s Relaxed Interpretation of Cross-Retaliation in the 
World Trade Organization, 9 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 135, 136 (2010). 
 49 See generally Raj Bhala, The Myth About Stare Decisis and International Trade Law 
(Part One of a Trilogy), 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 845 (1999) (discussing the lack of a formal 
doctrine of stare decisis for WTO decisions and how the WTO, regardless of this fact, seems 
to have a practical system of precedent it follows). 
 50 EC-Bananas, supra note 44. 
 51 See Development and Cooperation-Europeaid, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
europeaid/where/acp/country-cooperation/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013). 
 52 See Decision of the Council of European Communities of 22 January 1972 on the 
Accession of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway and the United 
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ACP countries and it resulted in the Treaty of Lomé (Lomé).53  Lomé helped 
shape a uniform banana regime for the European Economic Community.54  
This new banana regime gave preference to ACP countries with both quotas 
and tariffs.55  After a prolonged dispute brought by Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Mexico, and the United States, a Dispute Settlement Body panel 
determined that this regime violated various obligations under the WTO and 
its different agreements.56  This led to a series of appeals57 between the EC 
and the aggrieved parties until the Dispute Settlement Body ultimately 
authorized Ecuador to suspend some of its WTO concessions with the EC by 
way of cross-retaliation.58  Particularly, Ecuador “received authorization to 
suspend $201.6 million in concessions and other obligations under the WTO 
Agreements, including . . . [TRIPS] and the . . . [GATS].”59  These approved 
                                                                                                                   
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the European Atomic Energy Community, 
1972 O.J. (L 73). 
 53 ACP-EEC Convention of Lomé, O.J. (L 25), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 595 (1975); see 
generally Zsolt K. Besskó, Going Bananas Over EEC Preferences?: A Look at the Banana 
Trade War and the WTO’s Understanding On Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 265 (1996) (stating that pressure from United 
Kingdom resulted in replacement of Yaounde Conventions with Lomé, which changed 
relationship between EEC and former colonies from an association to a partnership). 
 54 Council Regulation 404/93, 1993 O.J. (L 47/1) (establishing a uniform banana regime for 
the EEC “within the framework of the Lomé Convention Agreements”).  
 55 See Besskó, supra note 53 (stating ACP countries were allowed to import up to a maximum 
of 857,700 tons of bananas into the common market duty free); see also Council Regulation 
404/93 art. 15 (explaining non-traditional ACP countries and third countries may import up to 2 
million tons into the common market at a 100 ECU/ton Tariff); accord Council Regulation 
404/93 art. 18 (stating imports over the 2 million ton quota were subject to a 750ECU/ton tariff 
for ACP country imports and an 850 per ton tariff for third country imports). 
 56 Panel Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution 
of Bananas: Complaint by Ecuador, WT/DS27/R/ECU (May 22, 1997); Panel Report, 
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas: 
Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras, WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND (May 22, 
1997); Panel Report, United States: European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale 
and Distribution of Bananas: Complaint by the United States, WT/DS27/R/USA (May 22, 
1997) (noting that all complaining parties asserted inconsistencies under Articles 1.2, 1.3, 3.2, 
and 3.5 of the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures and Articles 2 and 17 of the 
General Agreements in Trade Services). 
 57 Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and 
Distribution of Bananas, ¶ 3, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997); see also Report of the Panel, 
European Communities-Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas-
recourse to Article 21.5 by Ecuador-, 1, 3, WT/DS27/RW/ECU (Apr. 12, 1999). 
 58 See EC-Bananas, supra note 50, at 173. 
 59 Matthew S. Dunne III, Note, Redefining Power Orientation: A Reassessment of 
Jackson’s Paradigm in Light of Asymmetries of Power, Negotiation, and Compliance in the 
GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement System, 34 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 305 (2002).  
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actions were reportedly going to be used in a number of ways to leverage the 
EC’s compliance, one of which was to mass-produce Ecuadorean 
“Champagne” that was indistinguishable in labeling from the legitimate 
French variety, thus putting pressure on France.60  Even though the 
authorization was granted, the suspensions were never actually 
implemented.61  Instead, they were used as a bargaining tool that led to an 
agreement in October of 2000.62  While previous retaliation actions were 
primarily between major developing powers and developed powers, this 
marked the first time in the history of the WTO that a low power member-
state sought retaliation against a member-state with great influence inside 
and outside of the Organization.63 
4.  U.S.-Cotton 
The second time that cross-retaliation was approved was the U.S.-Cotton 
dispute between the United States and Brazil.64  Brazil claimed the U.S. 
agricultural subsidies to the American cotton industry violated the principles 
of the WTO.65  The Dispute Settlement Body agreed.66  It authorized Brazil 
to cross-retaliate by suspending its TRIPS obligations to the United States, 
ultimately resulting in a change of U.S. cotton subsidy policy in multiple 
                                                                                                                   
 60 Gabrielle Marceau, Counsellor, Legal Division, WTO, Lecture in Geneva, CHE (Jul. 16, 
2013) (notes on file with author). 
 61 Dunne, supra note 59, at 307. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 305 (citing Andrew S. Bishop, The Second Legal Revolution in International Trade 
Law: Ecuador Goes Ape in Banana Trade War with European Union, 12 INT’L LEGAL PERSP. 
1, 2 (2001) (noting that the authorization obtained by Ecuador to retaliate against the EC 
“represented the first time that the WTO had ever authorized a [low-power state] to impose 
retaliatory measures on another member”)). 
 64 See Panel Report, United States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 
2004) [hereinafter Panel Report Upland Cotton]; see generally Appellate Body Report, United 
States—Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States – Subsidies on Upland Cotton – Recourse to 
Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM 
Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/1 (Aug. 31, 2009); see also Decision by the Arbitrator, United 
States – Recourse to Arbitration by the United States Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and 
Article 7.10 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009).  (These reports are 
collectively referred to as U.S.-Cotton in this Note.)  
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areas67 after the two countries came to a settlement before any cross-
retaliation measures were implemented.68   
5.  U.S.-Gambling 
The third and final instance of the Dispute Settlement Body approving 
cross-retaliation was a result of the U.S.-Gambling dispute.69  As discussed 
previously,70 Antigua and Barbuda claimed the United States violated the 
GATS when it banned the use of online gambling websites, particularly 
those headquartered in Antigua, but allowed gambling in various locations 
throughout the United States.71  The Dispute Settlement Body agreed with 
Antigua and Barbuda.72  After the United States failed to comply with the 
WTO ruling, the WTO authorized Antigua to cross-retaliate against the 
United States; now, Antigua could suspend its concessions to the United 
States under TRIPS and violate U.S. intellectual property law.73  While the 
general consensus of the international legal community was that Antigua 
would not retaliate,74 the tiny island nation has recently declared that it 
planned to do just that.75 
                                                                                                                   
 67 Townsend, supra note 48, at 135–36, 153–55 (examining the policy changes the U.S. 
implemented in light of U.S.-Cotton: removing the program that gave subsidies to buyers of 
the more expensive American cotton and modifying export credit guarantees to be less 
protective from the fluctuations of the market). 
 68 Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S., Brazil Agree Upon Path 
Toward Negotiated Solution of Cotton Dispute (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/us-brazil-agree-upon-path-toward-negotiated-s 
olution. 
 69 Decision by the Arbitrator, United States — Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21, 2007). 
 70 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 71 Decision by the Arbitrator-Gambling, supra note 37. 
 72 Appellate Body Report, United States Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 373(c)(ii), WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 
Appellate Body Report-Gambling]. 
 73 Recourse by Antigua and Barbuda to Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States-Measures 
Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/22 (June 22, 
2007). 
 74 Gabriel L. Slater, Note, The Suspension of Intellectual Property Obligations Under 
TRIPS: A Proposal for Retaliating Against Technology-Exporting Countries in the World 
Trade Organization, 97 GEO. L.J. 1365, 1368, 1378–79 (2009). 
 75 Levick Release, supra note 8. 
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6.  TRIPS’ IP Suspension  
To date, the Dispute Settlement Body has authorized the suspension of 
TRIPS IP obligations in two of these three disputes:76 EC-Bananas III77 and 
U.S.-Gambling.78  The first of these two disputes came to a close when the 
European Community agreed to change its unfair trade practices regarding 
bananas and become compliant with its WTO obligations.79  However, the 
second of the two disputes is still up in the air, with the WTO approving 
Antigua’s proposed suspension of U.S. copyrights and Antigua threatening to 
act on their proposal.80  Antigua’s proposal removes its obligations under the 
TRIPS81 agreement as retaliation for the United States’ refusal to comply 
with its GATS82 obligations in regards to online gambling services.83  
Adding even more intrigue to the dispute, there are rumors that Antigua will 
work in collaboration with the infamous website, The Pirate Bay, to set up a 
file-sharing website to implement the cross-retaliation.84  The website would 
either give away U.S. copyrighted materials for free and make back the lost 
$3.4 billion through ad revenue or sell access to the copyrighted material for 
a meager amount.85 
If Antigua goes through with its threat, it will mark the first occurrence 
such a right has ever been exercised under the WTO.86  In terms of 
obligations, this would arguably represent a fundamental change from what 
was originally agreed to by the high contracting parties. 
                                                                                                                   
 76 Id. at 1368. 
 77 EC-Bananas, supra note 50. 
 78 Decision by Arbitrator-Gambling, supra note 37. 
 79 See Joe Kirwin, EU Foreign Ministers Give Qualified Backing to Transitional Banana 
Tariff-Quota Proposal, 17 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1540, 1540 (Oct. 12, 2000). 
 80 Levick Release, supra note 8. 
 81 TRIPS, supra note 21. 
 82 GATS, supra note 10. 
 83 Levick Release, supra note 8. 
 84 Ernesto, supra note 12. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Elizabeth J. Drake, Antigua and U.S. Dispute Proposed Withdrawal of Intellectual 
Property Rights Protections as Authorized WTO Retaliation: Implications for the WTO 
Dispute Settlement System (2013), available at http://www.stewartlaw.com/article/ViewArti 
cle/846. 
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B.  WIPO and the International Copyright Regime 
The nations of the world have attempted to deal with the issue of 
intellectual property on an international scale long before the creation of 
TRIPS and the WTO.87  There are numerous treaties that collectively form 
the patchwork of international intellectual property law.88  The World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), an organ of the United Nations, 
administers a large portion of these treaties.89  These WIPO treaties exist in 
tandem with TRIPS.90  WIPO administers twenty-six individual treaties,91 
but two in particular stand out in importance to this discussion: the Berne 
Convention and the Paris Convention.   
1.  The Berne Convention 
The Berne Convention (Berne)92 is the most important of the WIPO 
treaties for purposes of this discussion.  Berne establishes standards for 
international copyright protection.93  When TRIPS was drafted many years 
after the creation of the Berne, it borrowed specific language from Berne and 
directly incorporated those provisions into its own obligations.94  There was 
no requirement for the contracting parties of TRIPS to join Berne if they had 
not already done so.95  What occurred was simply an adoption of a set of 
standards that was already in place.  Most importantly for the discussion at 
hand, this absorption of Berne’s language did not absorb the high contracting 
parties obligations under that convention.96  As a result, since there is no 
                                                                                                                   
 87 See WIPO—A Brief History, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/about-wip 
o/en/history.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).  
 88 Jonathan Franklin, International Intellectual Property Law, American Society of 
International Law Electronic Resource Guide 4 (Feb. 8, 2013), available at http://www.asil. 
org/sites/default/files/ERG_IP.pdf.  
 89 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/tre 
aties/en/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).  
 90 Slater, supra note 74, at 1375–76.  
 91 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, supra note 89.  
 92 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, S. 
Treaty Doc. No. 99-27, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and amended 
in 1979); see Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works (1886), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary 
_berne.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2013). 
 93 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77. 
 94 Id.  
 95 See id.  
 96 See id. 
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absorption of Berne’s treaty obligations, the WTO’s suspension of Antigua’s 
TRIPS obligations to the United States would have no effect on Antigua’s 
obligations under the Berne Convention,97 a treaty both countries are parties 
to.98 
2.  The Paris Convention  
The Paris Convention99 (Paris) harmonizes the international patent and 
trademark fields for the high contracting parties.100  As with Berne, TRIPS 
adopts language from Paris but it does not absorb the treaty obligations of 
Paris.101  Both the United States and Antigua are parties to Paris.102  This 
presents the same problem as Berne: obligations are copied, but not 
absorbed, and when obligations under one treaty are modified, the two 
treaties requirements imposed may conflict. 
C.  The Conflict 
When TRIPS adopted segments of Berne and Paris,103 but did not absorb 
the obligations that those respective treaties created, two pieces of 
international agreements that once fit together without conflict now exist in 
tension.  The cross-retaliation measures authorized by the Dispute Settlement 
Body allow for a fundamental shifting of the underlying treaty obligations 
for the high contracting parties involved.  This creates a collision course 
between the international intellectual property regimes of WIPO-
administered treaties and the international trade regime of the WTO and its 
underlying treaties. 
                                                                                                                   
 97 See id. 
 98 WIPO-Administered Treaties Contracting Parties Berne Convention, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (last visited Oct. 
24, 2013).  
 99 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, July 14, 1967, 
21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference); see 
Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/ paris/summary_paris.html (last visited 
Sept. 18, 2013). 
 100 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376. 
 101 Id. 
 102 WIPO Administered Treaties Contracting Parties Paris Convention, WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year= 
ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=2 (last visited Oct. 24, 2013).  
 103 See TRIPS, supra note 21. 
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III.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Overview 
This collision course begs the question: what does this tension mean for 
international law?  Multiple levels of analysis are necessary to answer this 
question.  A great deal of political brinkmanship is at play in this issue.  The 
politics of the U.S.-Antigua relationship and the lobbying efforts of 
Hollywood (much like the spirits lobby in the EC-Bananas dispute)104 and 
any other parties that would be harmed by Antigua’s threatened cross-
retaliation, will significantly impact the results of this dispute.  Trade and 
investment treaty negotiations, campaign contributions, and other national 
and international dealings will influence the outcome.  However, the main 
issue this Note examines is the impending legal conflict between Berne and 
TRIPS, as well as other potential regime clashes, and the ramifications 
stemming from them.   
There are a number of other possible conflicts that could result from the 
authorized cross-retaliation measures.  Conflicts between the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)105 and TRIPS or between the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and TRIPS.  The risk of some 
potential conflicts, such as between TRIPS and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
or Free Trade Agreements, has been hedged against by thoughtful treaty 
drafting.  Subsequently, these treaties will be examined for their utility in 
modeling future treaties and agreements to prevent conflict. 
B.  Conflicts 
There are a number of international regimes that could conflict as a result 
of Antigua’s approved cross-retaliation.  Some appear to be facial conflicts, 
such as Berne-TRIPS and NAFTA-TRIPS while others such as TRIPS-
ACTA, are more nuanced. Though ACTA references TRIPS, the national 
                                                                                                                   
 104 Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online Gambling Dispute, J. INT’L COM. & ECON. 
(2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/journals/online_gambling_dispu 
te.pdf (citing JAMES MCCALL SMITH, Compliance Bargaining in the WTO: Ecuador and the 
Bananas Dispute, in NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 
257–88 (John S. Odell ed., 2006) (explaining the European Spirits industry’s immediate 
lobbying efforts when their IP rights were threatening by cross-retaliation)). 
 105 North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. 
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legislation of the contracting parties implementing ACTA may create 
conflict.106  These three conflicts are examined in turn. 
1.  Berne-TRIPS  
If Antigua and Barbuda acts on its authorization to suspend its IP 
concessions to the United States, there will be a facial conflict between their 
obligations under the Berne Convention and their authorization to cross-
retaliate by suspending TRIPS concessions to the United States.107  If the 
conflict went the other way, a breach of TRIPS hypothetically authorized by 
Berne, this question might be answered more authoritatively by a ruling from 
the Dispute Settlement Body.  However, because Berne does not authorize a 
tribunal to enforce its implementation,108 its obligations might simply go 
unenforced.  Conversely, the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO has 
already spoken on this matter, not surprisingly ruling on behalf of itself that 
its obligations and authorizations are superior.109 
Another wrinkle involved in the possibility of The Pirate Bay’s 
involvement is that the website’s founders were prosecuted and convicted in 
a Swedish court110 for the very same acts that they would be committing by 
helping Antigua.  Because the website would deal with U.S. copyright and it 
would presumably be operated from Antigua, the very nature of such a 
website would make it universally accessible.  The cross-retaliation between 
Antigua and Barbuda and the United States could jump across the Atlantic 
Ocean to Europe with a few clicks of the mouse.  Could those involved in 
this proposed file sharing website be prosecuted elsewhere for their actions?  
What about the individuals downloading the copyright-suspended material 
for free or for a fee they paid to Antigua?  How much preemption, if any, 
does an authorization from the Dispute Settlement Body have over other 
                                                                                                                   
 106 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, art. 6 § 1, Oct. 1, 2011, available at http://www. 
mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf [hereinafter ACTA]. 
 107 Slater, supra note 74, at 1375–77. 
 108 Berne, supra note 92; Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77; Allen Z. Hertz, Shaping the 
Trident: Intellectual Property under NAFTA, Investment Protection Agreements and at the 
World Trade Organization, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 261, 268–76 (1997). 
 109 See JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: HOW WTO 
LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346–47 (2003); see also EC-Bananas, 
supra note 44; ERICH VRANES, Cross Retaliation Under GATS and TRIPS — An Optimal 
Enforcement Device for Developing Countries?, in THE BANANA DISPUTE: AN ECONOMIC AND 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 122–27 (Fritz Breuss et al. eds., 2003). 
 110 Pfanner, supra note 4.   
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international or even national legal regimes?  These questions threaten 
dangerous international ramifications from Antiqua’s proposed action that 
will be discussed more fully later in this Note. 
2.  ACTA-TRIPS  
While the main issues of conflicting international regimes would certainly 
arise from treaties and organizations that both the United States and Antigua 
are parties to, there remains the possibility of issues arising from treaties 
those countries have not ratified.  Other multilateral treaties, such as ACTA, 
impose obligations on their members to have enforcement measures in place 
for the protection of the intellectual property rights of other member states.111  
This obligation creates a very real possibility that a third-party nation to the 
U.S.-Antigua dispute would become involved if one of its citizens partook in 
the “Freedom Bay.”  The treaty is non-self-executing,112 which essentially 
obligates the high contracting parties to implement the provisions of the law 
with their own national legislation.113  So, while ACTA states, “[n]othing in 
this Agreement shall derogate from any obligation of a Party with respect to 
any other Party under existing agreements, including the TRIPS 
Agreement”114 it is still an independent treaty from TRIPS.  Additionally, the 
laws passed by each high contracting party are also independent from 
TRIPS: 
Each Party shall ensure that enforcement procedures are 
available under its law so as to permit effective action against 
any act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered 
by this Agreement, including expeditious remedies to prevent 
infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to 
further infringements.  These procedures shall be applied in 
                                                                                                                   
 111 ACTA, supra note 106, art. 6, § 1. 
 112 Monika Ermert, Last Parliament Standing: Europe Final Stronghold of ACTA Critics, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 21, 2011, 7:39 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/12/21/last-
parliament-standing-europe-final-stronghold-of-acta-critics/. 
 113 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (1 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 
U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that self-executing treaties require no implementing 
legislation to make them operative). 
 114 ACTA, supra note 106, art. 1. 
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such a manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade and to provide for safeguards against their abuse.115 
There is also conflict in regard to interpreting how ACTA and TRIPS 
interact.  For example, some commentators view TRIPS as not merely a 
benchmark for the bare minimum of intellectual property protections 
required by member-states, but also as the maximum allowable for a state to 
establish.116  If this interpretation were correct, any “TRIPS-plus” protections 
such as ACTA would violate TRIPS117 and possibly lead to a WTO dispute.  
Such a conflict could be avoided if the WTO better defined whether TRIPS 
acts merely as a floor or both as a minimum and maximum limit to 
enforcement.  Additionally, the WTO could rewrite ACTA’s national 
enforcement obligation provision to specify exactly how the provisions 
should interact with TRIPS obligations rather than merely saying that the 
national legislation should “avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate 
trade.”118  Better regard for the interactions between international agreements 
of a similar subject matter would be incredibly beneficial for preventing 
future conflicts of this sort. 
3.  NAFTA-TRIPS 
Another regime that TRIPS could possibly conflict with is NAFTA.119  
While the WTO has derogation exceptions for regional trade unions under 
Article XXIV, these exceptions only apply to preferential treatment of goods 
and other concessions.120  Article XXIV does not apply to interpretations, 
judgments, or determinations of the tribunals of such regional trade 
unions.121  NAFTA has such tribunals.122  With both trade unions having 
their own independent tribunals, there is always a possibility that the bodies 
                                                                                                                   
 115 Id. art. 6 § 1. 
 116 Henning Grosse Ruse-Khan, A Trade Agreement Creating Barriers to International 
Trade?: ACTA Border Measures and Goods in Transit, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 645, 654–55 
(2011). 
 117 Id. at 655. 
 118 ACTA, supra note 106, art. 6 § 1. 
 119 See NAFTA, supra note 105. 
 120 GATT, supra note 25, art. XXIV § 5. 
 121 Id. 
 122 NAFTA, supra note 105, art. 20.3; Anthony DePalma, Nafta’s Powerful Little Secret; 
Obscure Tribunals Settle Disputes, but Go Too Far, Critics Say, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/11/business/nafta-s-powerful-little-secret-obscure-tribunals-
settle-disputes-but-go-too-far.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm (last visited Dec. 5, 2013). 
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will hand down conflicting rulings or interpretations.  This will very likely 
come to a head in the recent Zeroing cases that came before both tribunals.123  
Zeroing is a practice related to what is known as “dumping” in the trade 
world that has become rather contentious in recent years.124   
This problem is more nuanced than the ACTA-TRIPS relationship 
because both bodies have tribunals that can very rule differently on the same 
subject matter including when the parties involved are subject to both 
rulings.  To stymie such a situation, one body would likely need to defer to 
the other.  Whether such deference would be given is unclear. 
C.  Models to Prevent Future Conflict 
A handful of treaties and agreements that have occurred post-Berne have 
had the foresight to outline how they will interact with other existing treaties.  
This practice insulates the contracting parties against any future conflicts of 
treaty obligations.  In the realm of IP law, such provisions seem to be 
exclusively contained in bilateral investment treaties and free trade 
agreements as opposed to larger multilateral agreements (though some of the 
free trade agreements are multilateral).  This Note will examine these treaties 
and agreements as models for future treaty drafting to prevent nations from 
entering into agreements that are initially not conflicting but gradually 
become so by modified obligations through adjudicative measures (such as 
cross-retaliation). 
1.  BITs 
Unlike international trade, which is mainly regulated by multilateral 
agreements like the WTO and NAFTA,125 investment is mostly dealt with in 
                                                                                                                   
 123 Article 1904 Binational Panel Review Pursuant to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement, USA-MEX-2007-1904-01; see generally Sungjoon Cho, The WTO Appellate 
Body Strikes Down the U.S. Zeroing Methodology Used in Antidumping Investigations, ASIL 
INSIGHTS (May 4, 2006), http://www.asil.org/insights/volu me/10/issue/10/wto-appellate-
body-strikes-down-us-zeroing-methodology-used-antidumping  (providing background on 
zeroing and the Appellate Body’s reaction to zeroing). 
 124 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 2005, 1868 U.N.T.S. 201; Anti-dumping, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE 
REPRESENTATIVE, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/wto-multilateral-affairs/wto-issues/tr 
ade-remedies/anti-dumping (last visited Oct. 24, 2013) (explaining the significance of 
dumping, anti-dumping regulation, and the role of the WTO in the matter). 
 125 Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes 
in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 697, 700 (1999). 
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separate, bilateral treaties126 that collectively resembles a “spaghetti bowl” of 
investment.127   
Many of these treaties commonly incorporate intellectual property 
provisions.128  Some BITs explicitly discuss their interaction with TRIPS, 
such as the U.S. Model BIT.129  However, others that are like the Model 
German BIT130 do not mention the GATS explicitly, though they do discuss 
interactions with other international obligations.131  While there is a 
possibility of conflict, these provisions seem to make such conflict highly 
unlikely by specifying the limits of the BIT in areas that it would interact 
with TRIPS or by stating that the provisions are in line with TRIPS and 
should be interpreted as such.  Subsequently, such a provision is a good 
model for how to draft a treaty or agreement in a way that avoids clashing 
treaty regimes or obligations.   
2.  Free Trade Agreements 
Another possible overlap arises from free trade agreements.  As 
previously mentioned, Article XXIV of the GATT allows for regional trade 
agreements and creates an exception for them in regards to other obligations 
under that treaty.132  These free trade agreements (FTAs), like BITs, often 
include provisions dealing with intellectual property.133  Most FTAs lay out 
                                                                                                                   
 126 Jeswald W. Salacuse & Nicholas P. Sullivan, Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their Grand Bargain, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 67, 67 (2005). 
 127 U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEV., INVESTMENT PROVISIONS IN ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION AGREEMENTS, at 10, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2005/10 (2006), available at http://uncta 
d.org/en/Docs/iteiit200510ch1_en.pdf. 
 128 Model US Bilateral Investment Treaty (2012) [hereinafter Model U.S. BIT], available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/BIT%20text%20for%20ACIEP%20Meeting.pdf; Model 
German Bilateral Investment Treaty (2008) [hereinafter Model German BIT], available at http:// 
www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1025.pdf; Model French Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (2006) http://www.italaw.com/documents/ModelTreaty France2006.pdf; Model Indian 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (2003), http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/archive/ita1026. 
pdf. 
 129 Model U.S. BIT, supra note 128. 
 130 Model German BIT, supra note 128. 
 131 Id. art. 7 § 1. 
  132  See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 133 U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Aust., art. 17.1, Mar. 3, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 1248 
[hereinafter U.S.-Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/up 
loads/agreements/fta/australia/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf; U.S.–Israel Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Isr., art. 14, Apr. 22, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter U.S.-Israel FTA], 
available at http://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005439.asp; 
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specific treaty obligations already in force and discuss the interaction 
between all of them, like the U.S.-Australia FTA134 and the E.U.-Korea 
FTA.135  However, some simply reaffirm existing IP treaty obligations in 
general without discussing specific treaties or provisions, like the U.S.-Israel 
FTA.136  Both styles seem to contemplate conflicts with the other treaties and 
subsequently hedge against any future clash by discussing the interactions 
between all the relevant treaties.  Possible conflict is also avoided by 
requiring both parties to ratify or accede to certain existing treaties, as seen 
in the U.S.-Australia FTA.137  Like the previously discussed BITs, FTAs of 
this type provide an excellent model for treaty drafting that would prevent 
future conflict of international regimes by specifically outlining where one 
treaty ends and the other begins, as well as where the treaties agree or do not 
overlap.  In regards to the different styles, it is not immediately clear which 
format would provide superior protection against such an outcome, but either 
route is more desirable than the status quo.   
D.  Lessons Learned 
1.  Risks of the Status Quo 
There are a number of lessons to be gleaned from this discussion of 
international regimes.  First, the amorphous nature of these numerous treaties 
and international bodies that come as a result of cross-retaliation measures 
creates the risk of conflict.  The use of linkage to achieve the aforementioned 
“grand bargain”138 by way of linking various issues such as trade and 
intellectual property together creates overlap between regimes.  The U.S.-
Antigua dispute represents a possible Pandora’s Box in this world of 
overlapping regimes.   
While there is certainly a possibility of the two nations settling before 
Antigua goes through with its threats,139 this situation represents a very real 
                                                                                                                   
NAFTRA, supra note 105, art. 1701; E.U.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-Kor., ch. 10, 
Oct. 15, 2009, 2011 O.J. (L 127), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUri 
Serv.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:127:FULL:EN:PDF.  
 134 U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 133. 
 135 E.U.-Korea FTA, supra note 133. 
 136 U.S.-Israel FTA, supra note 133. 
 137 U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 133, art. 17.1 §§ 2, 4. 
 138 Lovett, supra note 20, at 952. 
  139  See Hartley Henderson, Antigua offers a new proposal to end Internet gambling dispute 
with U.S., OFF SHORE GAMING ASSOC., available at http://www.osga.com/online_gaming_arti 
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conflict that can arise in the future despite the outcome of this specific 
dispute.  If not gambling, perhaps another issue of trade will arise between 
WTO member-states and spark a similar clash of regimes.  To avoid such a 
clash, the current state of overlapping systems of international regulation 
must be thoroughly reexamined and restructured into a uniform agreement or 
complimentary agreements.    
2.  Building on Past Success  
To explain the success of the WTO in further opening international trade 
and connecting markets,140 many point to the structure of the Dispute 
Settlement Body.141  The author of this Note posits that the success of the 
WTO is in part based upon the absorption of various existing treaties and 
their subsequent unification under the WTO, resulting in a more uniform 
system.  This success should be built upon by further streamlining the 
associated international regimes through merging treaties and simplifying 
obligations.  International IP regulation, as well as other international 
regimes with overlapping agreements, should undergo a unification effort to 
streamline the various agreements and multilateral treaties.  Such unification 
would create uniformity in the global market, make the resolution of 
international intellectual property issues and disputes more predictable, 
provide more stable and cognizable protection for intellectual property right 
holders, and, most importantly, eliminate the possibility of facing liability 
from one regime when following the authorized action or obligations of 
another regime. 
3.  Linkage Is a Double-Edged Sword 
Linkage can be a fantastic tool at the negotiating table.  However, if it is 
used haphazardly and continually without any unification of regimes along 
the way there will always be a possibility of conflicting regimes when there 
is an overlap.  Different rules, standards, and interpretations all present 
problematic encounters for such regimes and could very easily put nations in 
the awkward legal position of violating one regime to comply with another.  
                                                                                                                   
cles.php?Antigua-offers-a-new-proposal-to-end-Internet-gambling-dispute-with-U.S.-14330#. 
VVud0NNViko (last visited May 19, 2014).  
 140 See MARC L. BUSCH & ERIC REINHARDT, TRADE BRIEF ON THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
1 (2004), available at http://faculty.georgetown.edu/ mlb66/SIDA.pdf. 
 141 DSU, supra note 38, art. 1. 
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This possibility is even more likely with measures like cross-retaliation142 
being used that essentially modify the initial agreement and its obligations.  
A country could sign on to two different multilateral treaties that are not 
initially in conflict but eventually conflict when a cross-retaliation measure, 
or some other modifying action, is approved.  It could certainly be argued 
that such modifications are reasonably foreseeable and thus should be 
contemplated at the time of drafting or at least at the time of signing or 
ratification.  However, returning to the other WTO disputes mentioned, 
particularly the U.S.-Antigua dispute, the outcome was not expected.143  At 
the very least, it does not seem that the United States would have pushed so 
hard for the inclusion of cross-retaliation measures144 if it foresaw it being 
used in such a fashion against itself.  The more these measures are embraced, 
the more likely this collision of laws will occur.  When treaties do conflict, 
what will result is unclear. 
4.  A Realistic Approach  
There are various approaches that might clarify this issue.  From a simply 
realistic viewpoint, it would seem that whichever international regime was 
the most robust in terms of enforcement would win.  In the U.S.-Antigua 
dispute, it seems the WTO would come out on top over the WIPO 
administered treaties, such as Berne.  The WTO has the Dispute Settlement 
Body but Berne has no real means of enforcement in the United States as a 
non-self-executing treaty.145  In a situation where both regimes do have 
tribunals, like a hypothetical clash between NAFTA and the WTO, the result 
would be far more difficult to predict.  If two tribunals were to hand down 
conflicting rulings on the same issue, a member-state bound to both tribunals 
would be placed in an impossible legal situation.  Additionally, such a 
situation could open up a massive amount of liability for a country and its 
industries. 
                                                                                                                   
 142 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 
1867 U.N.T.S. 154. 
 143 Gary Rivlin, Online Gambling Pits Antigua against U.S. and Challenges WTO, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-ga 
mble.4.7214682.html?pagewanted=all.&_r=0. 
 144 Lowrey, supra note 11. 
 145 Robert J. Sherman, Note, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American Artists Burned 
Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 373, 403–06 (1995) (explaining how the United States Congress 
interpreted the Berne Convention in such a way that it was non-self-executing). 
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5.  An Interpretive Approach  
From an interpretive view of international law, the “winning” regime 
might be determined by which treaty came later.  Under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),146 the “latest 
expression of state intent, in casu, the [Dispute Settlement Body] 
authorisation [sic] [to suspend TRIPS obligations], must prevail.”147  In other 
words, whichever agreement came later would be the agreement that is 
binding in case of a conflict.  It would not be a stretch to apply such an 
interpretation to a conflict between an international organization, such as the 
Dispute Settlement Body, and a treaty, like Berne.  This would seemingly 
result in the WTO winning out over Berne in the U.S.–Antigua dispute.  
However, there is a multitude of potential problems involved in such an 
interpretation.   
First, the Vienna Convention seems to be contemplating one treaty being 
replaced with or superseded by a later-in-time treaty.  The drafters of the 
Vienna Convention likely did not contemplate treaties with an amorphous 
shape, such as the WTO treaties after the authorization of cross-retaliation,148 
because such treaties did not exist when the Vienna Convention was signed 
in 1969. As previously mentioned, TRIPS did not absorb the obligations of 
Berne nor did it expressly supersede Berne.149  It adopted much of the 
language of Berne,150 which seems to indicate the two treaties were intended 
to work together instead of the latter replacing the former.  That being said, 
the Vienna Convention does outline the analytical process for when you have 
successive treaties on the same subject.151  This analysis would point to 
                                                                                                                   
 146 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].  It should be noted that the United States has not ratified the 
Vienna Convention.  However, the Vienna Convention is largely a codification of the binding 
customary international law governing the relations between nations so it is still applicable.  
See, e.g., Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 431, 433–34 (2004). 
 147 Slater, supra note 74, at 1377 (explaining that the method of interpreting overlapping 
treaties and international organizations is based on the latest expression of state intent) (citing 
Pauwelyn, supra note 109). 
 148 DSU, supra note 38, arts. 1–30. 
 149 Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77. 
 150 Id.  
 151 Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 30(4)(a) (stating that as between States party to 
both successive treaties relating to the same subject matter where the earlier treaty is not 
terminated or suspended in operation under article 59 of the Vienna Treaty, the earlier treaty 
applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the latter treaty). 
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Berne only applying to the degree that it did not conflict with the WTO 
treaties, subsequently allowing for the cross-retaliation of Antigua against 
the United States under both the WTO treaties and Berne. 
Second, claiming that “the latest expression of state intent”152 is what 
determines which agreement trumps the other is obviously focusing the 
analysis on the intent of the state.  But if the United States never imagined 
the cross-retaliation provision being used to suspend IP rights as a result of 
its national legislation regarding online gambling, can it really be said that 
there was state intent?  The United States maintains that it never intended for 
online gambling to be included in the United States’ GATS obligations.153  
Those protests aside, the Appellate Body found that online gambling was 
within the scope of the United States’ GATS obligations,154 though they 
acknowledged that it was possible that online gambling entered into the 
scope by mistake.155  If it is the case that this obligation came by mistake, 
was “the latest expression of state intent” really to make the United States 
subject to suspensions of its IP rights?  While this is a seemingly valid 
concern of intent, it likely does not matter.  Whether or not the United States 
intended to subject itself to such suspensions of obligations by Antigua, 
expressed intent is what is key.156  The actual intentions of the United States 
do not affect what the Appellate Body found to be expressed by the United 
States in its GATS obligations.  Subsequently, this possible wrinkle would 
likely be overcome for the previously stated reasons. 
A third issue that could arise from an interpretation that the WTO treaties 
supplant Berne is the possibility of an Article 53 invalidation.  Article 53 of 
The Vienna Convention invalidates agreements that violate preemptory 
norms of international law at the time of signing.157  The United States could 
claim that the protection of IP rights is so fundamental to modern society that 
it is such a preemptory norm (or jus cogens) of international law that no 
derogation is allowed.  However, this would almost certainly fail as well.  
There are two major flaws in such an argument.  First, the very existence of 
the WTO and its 159 members158 would indicate that international custom 
                                                                                                                   
  152  Slater, supra note 74, at 1376–77. 
 153 Rothstein, supra note 10, at 174. 
 154 Appellate Body Report-Gambling, supra note 72.  
 155 Panel Report, Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting 
Services, ¶ 6.136, WT/D238/R (Nov. 10, 2004).  
 156 Slater, supra note 74, at 1377. 
 157 Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 53.  
 158 Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  
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does allow for derogation from IP rights since the WTO implements cross-
retaliation.  While the Vienna Convention does specify that it looks at the 
custom at the time of the signing,159 not after, there still would likely not be a 
strong consensus on IP rights and their protection.160  Second, and likely the 
most practical problem, the United States is simply not going to claim the 
whole WTO regime is invalidated merely so it can avoid losing a dispute.  In 
2010, the United States exported $518 billion in commercial services 
alone,161 making the $3.4 billion162 Antigua is claiming look like a mere 
pittance.  It would be completely irrational to jeopardize the whole system of 
trade, not just in services but goods as well, that the United States relies on 
for such a sum that is meager in comparison.   
IV.  CONCLUSION 
International law needs to become more unified and streamlined.  The 
U.S.-Antigua dispute is a warning of things to come, whether or not Antigua 
actually acts on its threat of cross-retaliation.  Sooner or later, international 
regimes and treaties will conflict in a grand fashion with disastrous results 
for both the member-states and the organizations themselves.  Such an 
outcome can be stymied—or even prevented entirely—by acting in two 
specific ways.  First, current multilateral agreements should be merged into a 
more streamlined organization, such the WTO, where it is appropriate and 
feasible.  Second, future treaties should be drafted in a way that contemplates 
interaction with other international obligations and regimes so the member 
states that are parties to both are not left guessing which obligation they 
should risk violating.  As technology advances and globalization connects 
the world more and more, new laws will be created and new forms of 
regulation will be drafted to keep up with the times.  These new laws and 
regulations must be formed with an eye on this issue to prevent a 
recrudescence of conflicting regimes.  Otherwise, the question of pirate or 
privateer will never be answered. 
                                                                                                                   
 159 Vienna Convention, supra note 146, art. 53.  
 160 Numerous countries implement practices that violate IP rights for various reasons.  One 
of the more notable examples is the advent of compulsory licenses.  The legal basis of this 
practice comes from Berne, supra note 92, art. 13(1), the very treaty that the United States 
would be relying on. 
 161 U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Recent Trends in U.S. Services Trade: 2012 Annual Report, at 
xiii (2012). 
 162  Kravets, supra note 12. 
